The jointly optimal inflation tax, income tax structure, and transfers by Preston J. Miller
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staff Report 193
Revised January 1999
The Jointly Optimal Inflation Tax,
Income Tax Structure, and Transfers
Preston J. Miller*
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
ABSTRACT
The welfare-maximizing income tax structure, rate of money creation, and amounts of intergenerational
transfers are jointly determined for given rates of government consumption. When government
consumption is zero, it is found for the parameter values examined that the income tax structure is
progressive, the rate of money change is negative, and positive transfers are made to the old. As
government consumption increases, the tax structure’s progressivity declines and turns increasingly
regressive, the rate of money change rises, and transfers decrease. It is found that the bulk of the increase
in government consumption is optimally financed by a cut in transfers.
*The author thanks Dan Chin for his capable research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Suppose government consumption permanently increases. Should greater or diminished use
be made of the inflation tax? Should the income tax be made more or less progressive? Should
intergenerational transfers be increased or decreased? In this paper the answers to all three of these
questions are jointly determined.
The model used for analysis is the third in a progression. The first in the progression, Miller
(1984), assumed a real economy with serially independent shocks to technology. The second, Miller
(1993a), extended the original model by incorporating endogenously valued fiat money in fixed
supply. The model in the current paper extends the model in Miller (1993a) in three ways by
allowing
1. positive rates of government consumption,
2. nonzero rates of money growth, and
3. serial correlation in the technology shocks.
With the exception of these noted differences, the economic environment of all three models is the
same.
The general modeling approach taken here shares many attributes of other modern approaches
to public finance. The model is general equilibrium with explicit description of endowments,
production processes, information availability, market structure, government policies, and individual
optimization problems. The general equilibrium approach offers at least three advantages over a
macroeconomic approach. First, it assures internal consistency of behavioral functions, since they
are all derived within a common economic environment. Second, behavioral relations are invariant
to changes in policy rules, that is, the model is not subject to the Lucas critique, because individual
decision rules explicitly depend on the policy rules. Third, the policy objectives can be stated in
terms of individual welfare. This follows because the utilities of all individuals can be determined
as functions of their consumption and leisure.2
Like other modern approaches, the model is dynamic. Thus, public finance policies affect the
allocation of consumption and leisure over time and distort by altering the marginal rates of
intertemporal substitution.
In addition, the model incorporates fundamental uncertainty in the form of random shocks to
technology. Since the model’s structure implies that private insurance against these shocks is not
feasible, it allows a role for government insurance which takes the form of automatic economic
stabilization.
Despite these similarities to other modern approaches, the modeling approach taken here
differs from the others in some significant ways.
1 Other models tend to share these characteristics:
They include representative agents who are infinitely lived.
They include physical capital.
They employ fairly general functional forms and stochastic processes.
They can be calibrated.
While my model has none of these features, it has others that the more standard models tend
not to have:
It has a nonlinear income tax.
It allows an endogenously valued fiat money.
It determines a socially optimal scale of intergenerational tax/transfers; e.g., social security.
If one is to stray from the flock, there is a burden to demonstrate what is gained. I believe
the primary gain is that my model provides answers and insights to public finance questions which
are not even addressed in the standard models. The present model also provides useful examples and
counterexamples from a fully specified general equilibrium model which take the form:
“It is possible that...” ,o r3
“It is not always true that...” .
However, the judgment about whether this line of research is useful must be made by the
readers. So to aid in this judgment, I briefly describe the common structure of the three models in
the progression, note how each model extends the one before it, and then list the main findings and
insights from each model. After this lengthy introduction, I formally describe the present model, the
solution, and the policy implications.
The Models and Their Messages
The basic structure of all the models in the progression is the same. There is a constant
population of two-period lived agents. The agents divide their time between work and leisure in their
first period of life and retire in their second period. There are constant returns to labor input, but the
return is random and can take on a “good” or “bad” value. The return shock occurs and then the
young agents come on the scene, so that no private risk-sharing is possible. Agents care about
consumption and leisure in each period of life. The government taxes agents when they are young
and working and transfers the proceeds to agents who, in the second period of their lives, are retired.
The government’s objective is to maximize welfare of the young and the future generations, which
is shown to be equivalent to minimizing the sum of “distortion” and “instability.”
In the first model in the progression, shocks to technology are serially uncorrelated, there is
no government consumption, and there is no money, so that all taxes are real. Income taxes are
nonlinear: When marginal tax rates rise with income levels the tax is “progressive;” when they fall
with income levels, the tax is “regressive.” In the second version of the model, the initial old are
endowed with a fixed stock of fiat money. Although the total stock of money is fixed over time,
there is a difference in this version of the model between real and nominal income taxes. Real taxes
relate real tax revenues to real income, while nominal taxes relate nominal tax revenues to nominal4
income. The difference between the two occurs because tax schedules are nonlinear. In the third,
and present, version of the model, shocks to technology can be serially correlated, the government
can consume at a constant rate, and the money stock can grow or shrink at a constant rate.
In the first model, in which there is no serial correlation to technology shocks, no government
consumption, and no money, the main findings are:
1. Reducing economic distortion should not be the sole goal of tax policy. Reducing
economic instability is also a proper goal.
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2. It is possible that government tax policies can reduce the instability in income while
increasing economic instability in terms of consumption and leisure.
3. Although there is a role for reducing economic instability, a regressive income tax, which
increases instability relative to a linear or progressive tax, appears optimal.
In the second model, which differs from the first only by the inclusion of a fixed stock of fiat
money, the main findings are:
1. Different tax policy implications can follow in real and monetary models. This basically
results from the two having different market structures.
2. The optimal income tax structure can be progressive. In a monetary model, as compared
to a real model, the insurance, or stabilization, role of the tax/transfer system becomes
relatively more important than its redistributive role, and a progressive tax provides
insurance, or stability.
3. A nominal income tax (nonindexed) may be preferred to a real income tax (indexed). In
this model, the nominal tax has the price level as a shifter, which allows a regressive
structure in each state but higher tax rates in the good state than in the bad.5
4. One tax can imply a higher mean and lower variance of real income than another and still
be less desirable. Thus, evaluating policies according to the behavior of a proxy like real
GDP can be misleading.
In the present model, there can be serial correlation to technology shocks, positive government
consumption, and steady growth or shrinkage in the money stock. While the findings from the
previous two versions of the model have been described more fully in the previous publications, the
findings from the present version of the model have not been described at all. So, instead of just
giving a general overview, I first describe the main findings and then provide an intuitive explanation
for them.
The findings are based on a numerical analysis of the model. The numerical parameter values
are chosen to produce labor supply functions with reasonable properties:
Labor supply is between 0 and 1, where 1 is all the time available.
Labor supply is increasing in its rate of return. That is, more labor is supplied when
productivity is relatively high and when income taxes are relatively low.
A sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to parameter value choices, but it appears that the
labor supply specifications are the only crucial ones.
The major findings from the numerical analysis include:
1. For all parameter values examined, the government optimally runs a surplus and shrinks
the stock of money.
2. As government consumption increases,
a. Income tax revenues increase,
b. The income tax structure becomes more regressive,
c. The deflation subsidy decreases, and
d. Transfers decline.6
3. The bulk of the increase in government consumption is accommodated by a decline in
transfers.
4. Higher government consumption results in higher output and lower prices. However,
since it reduces consumption and leisure, it also results in lower welfare.
5. Greater serial correlation increases welfare by making outcomes more predictable.
Thus, it diminishes the need for transfers to insure against instability and allows lower
taxation.
The first finding is a bit surprising, since the model has overlapping generations and distorting
taxes. The finding holds when government consumption is zero. That suggests that when an optimal
tax/transfer scheme exists, a rate of deflation is required to provide the proper incentive to private
saving.
The second set of findings suggests that when all forms of financing distort, the pain should
be spread over all of them. As more taxes are raised, distortion becomes increasingly more important
than instability, so that the income tax structure moves from progressive to regressive.
Reducing transfers to the old is the least distorting way to accommodate higher government
consumption, and that explains the third finding. In a dynamic model, this does not translate into
stealing from the old to give to the young. At some time all agents (except the current old) are both
young and then later old. Thus, reducing transfers amounts to a tax on second-period consumption.
Increasing this tax to cover higher government consumption allows agents to best adjust their
demands for consumption, leisure, and insurance.
The fourth finding is intuitive with respect to output but not with respect to prices. When
government consumption is financed primarily by lower transfers, agents’ utility loss is spread over
the utilities associated with consumption and leisure. By accepting less leisure, agents work more
and produce more. But since leisure does not wholly absorb the loss, output increases by less than7
government consumption. The finding with respect to prices is explained by the government’s
response to its greater consumption and by agents’ desire to increase private savings. In this model
the government reduces transfers by close to the amount of its increase in consumption, so
government expenditures and the budget deficit barely budge. However, since the brunt of additional
financing for government consumption is borne by a tax on second-period consumption, agents desire
to increase their private saving, so that their loss in income is distributed in a more balanced way
between first- and second-period consumption. The demand for greater savings implies a lower price
level (a higher value of savings).
The fifth finding seems intuitive. It follows that with lower taxes, agents decide to “make
more hay when the sun shines.” Although their utility declines from having less leisure, the
additional consumption they enjoy is more than offsetting.
In the text that follows, the model and its solution are formally described, and results of
numerical exercises are reported and discussed. The paper concludes with an extended discussion
concerning the applicability of the model’s main findings.
The Model
1. Population
In each period N identical individuals are born. Each individual lives two periods. Thus, in
each period there are N “old” in the last period of their lives and N “young” in the first period of
their lives. Without loss of generality it is assumed thatN=1 .
2. Individual Welfare
Individual preferences are represented by a time-separable utility function in consumption and
leisure:
W=U ( c 1 , ˜ L 1 )+b U(c2,˜ L2)8
where for an individual of a given generation ci is consumption in the i
th period of life; L ˜
i is leisure
in the i
th period of life, 0 £ L ˜
i £ 1; and the contemporaneous utility function U is assumed to be
differentiable and concave.
Special assumptions are made about U and its arguments in order to make the numerical
analysis tractable. In particular, it is assumed that
U(c,˜ L) = −A(c−c*)2 −B ( ˜ L−˜ L*)2
whereA>0 ,B>0 ,t h esatiation level of consumption c* is at least as large as any feasible level,
and the satiation level of leisure L ˜* is all the time available: L ˜* º 1.
3. Endowments
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time each period. In the first period that time
is divided between leisure L ˜
1 and labor L: L ˜
1 ³ 0, L ³ 0, and L ˜
1 + L = 1. In the second period all
time goes to leisure: L ˜
2 º 1.
An individual in the current old generation is endowed with M/N = M units of fiat money.
4. Production
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The young in any period observe µ before they decide on how much labor to supply.
5. Exchange
In any period the young and old exchange goods and money. The old sell money, their
savings, to purchase goods. The young sell the goods they produced to acquire money, their savings.
Private insurance markets cannot operate due to the assumed timing of productivity shocks. Since
the current young appear after the shock to productivity has occurred, they cannot insure against
fluctuations in first-period income. They would like to insure against fluctuations in second-period
income; but only the current old could sell the insurance, and they will not be around in the next
period to pay off. The absence of private insurance is meant to reflect that in the real world agents
cannot fully insure their labor income against business cycle risks.
6. Government
On a continuing basis the government consumes at a constant, state-independent real rate G.
It also spends in real terms for state-contingent transfers Tr
kk¢(t+1), where the date of the transfers is
taken to be t + 1, k¢ is the state at t + 1, and k is the state at date t; that is, µ(t) = µ
k and µ(t+1) = µ
k¢,
where k, k¢ =Bo rG .
The government has two sources of revenue. One is a real, quadratic income tax which




2. The government can also
raise seignorage by expanding the stock of money at a constant rate l; that is, M(t+1) = (1+l)M(t)
for all t, where l³−1. The government’s current-dollar, point-in-time budget constraint at date t +
1 is, then,10
p k¢(t+1)G + p k¢(t+1)Tr kk¢(t+1) = p k¢(t+1)T k¢(t+1) + M(t+1) − M(t).
From the definitions above, the budget constraint can be expressed in real terms as




The aim of the analysis is to trace out the locus of optimal policy choice variables (t ˆ1,t ˆ2,l ˆ)
as functions of the policy parameter G. For a given G, the search for the optimal policy choice
variables is done in two steps. In the first step, individual demand functions and market-clearing
conditions are found (numerically) for arbitrary values of t1, t2, and l. From these expressions it is
also possible to determine allocations of consumption and leisure, and hence utility, for agents of all
generations. Analysis pertaining to this first step is described under the heading “equilibrium.”
In the second step values for t1, t2, and l that maximize social welfare are found. Social
welfare is taken to be the discounted sum of the unconditional utilities of all agents in current and
future generations. An interpretation is that a social planner at date t, who does not observe the
current period’s productivity shock, seeks to maximize the weighted sum of utilities of current and
future agents, where the sum of the weights converges to a finite value. Analysis pertaining to this
second step is described under the heading “optimization.”
The analyses of equilibrium and optimization are simplified by recognizing that equilibria
must be stationary. Because there is no capital in the model, because the government choice variables
are assumed to be time independent, and because the productivity shock process is assumed to be
first-orderMarkov,current-periodindividualdemandfunctionsandmarket-clearingconditionsdepend
only on the productivity shocks in the immediate past and current periods. Stationarity also implies
that the unconditional expected utilities of agents from the current and all future generations must be11
the same. Thus, maximizing the social welfare function is equivalent to maximizing the unconditional
expected utility of the current young.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of sequences of prices and quantities such that at each date markets
clear and agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraints. There are three markets in the
model: labor, consumption goods, and money. By Walras’ Law, equilibrium in any two implies
equilibrium in the third. In this analysis the two markets are taken to be labor and money.
In a stationary equilibrium excess demand functions for consumption, labor, and real money
holdings depend on the previous state µ(t−1) and the current state µ(t), but the dependence is time
invariant. Consumption in the second period of an agent’s life, then, depends on the state of
technology in both the first and second periods of that agent’s life. However, decisions made in the
first period of an agent’s life do not depend on the state of technology before that agent was born.
Therefore, consumption demand in the first period of life, labor supply, and real money demand
depend only on the current state. It follows that a stationary equilibrium for given parameter values
can be found by solving for ˆ L
B, ˆ L
G,ˆ m
B , and ˆ m
G, where ˆ L
i is the desired amount of labor supplied
in state i and ˆ m
i is the desired holdings of real balances in state i; ˆ m º S M, and S º 1/p. Then the
equilibrium, which requires market-clearing in the labor and money markets, recognizes that labor
demand is identically equal to labor supply and that the supply of money is given exogenously by
M(t) = (1+l)
tM(0), and without loss of generality M(0) is taken to be 1.
The individual’s choice problem when young is to maximize expected utility over the two
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2 µ(t)], the expectation of the second-period
component to utility after observing µ(t) but before observing µ(t+1). The maximization problem for
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Now let R º (1+l)

































































When they are young, the agents face one budget constraint if µ(t) = µ
B and another if µ(t) =
µ
G. The constraints are


























Using the expressions derived above, we can write the conditional maximization problems of
the young in terms of the four decision variables L
B,L
G ,m
B , and m
G:
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From the government’s budget constraint we have that transfers in period t are independent




GB = t1ˆ L
B + t2ˆ L
B2






GG = t1qˆ L
G + t2(qˆ L
G)
2 + (1−R) ˆ m
G −G .
After these substitutions into (iii) and (iv) are made, those two equations can be written as
(iii)¢ a ˆ m
B2 + b ˆ m
B + c ˆ m
G2 + d ˆ m
G =0
and
(iv)¢ a ˆ m
G2 + e ˆ m
G + c ˆ m
B + f ˆ m
B =0
where
a º 1+b qR
b º (1−bqR)c* − [1 − (1+bqR)t1]ˆ L
B + (1+bqR)t2ˆ L
B2 − bqRG
c ºb (1−q)R
d º c t1qˆ L
G + t2(qˆ L
G)
2 −G−c *
eº(1−bqR)c* − [1 − (1+bqR)t1]qˆ L
G + (1+bqR)t2(qˆ L
G)
2 − bqRG
f º c [t1ˆ L
B+t2ˆ L
B2−G−c*].
From (iii)¢ and (iv)¢ it is possible to transform the variables using fº ˆ m
G /ˆ m
B. This generates two
equations to replace (iii)¢ and (iv)¢:
(v) (ce−ad)f
3 +( cf−ab)f
2 +( ae−cd)f +( af−bc)=0
and15
(vi) ˆ m
B =− ( b + d f )/(a+cf
2).
System (i), (ii), and (v), then, is three cubic equations in three unknowns: ˆ L
B, ˆ L
G, and f.
Values for ˆ m
B can easily be found from the solution by using equation (vi), and ˆ m
G can be found
from the definition of f:ˆ m
G ºfˆ m
B. Although the three-equation system has only known parameters
in addition to the three unknowns, the unknowns appear in more than one equation, and thus a
numerical solution technique is required. The solution routine postulates initial values of L
B and L
G
such that 0 < L
B <L
G< 1 and then uses a Gauss-Siedel method cycling the three equations until the
values of the variables converge. The order of equations solved is first (v), from which m
B and m
G
are derived, and then (i) followed by (ii). Each time an equation is solved, the routine selects the
single real root with appropriate domain: f >1a n d0<L
B<L
G< 1. From the solution values for
the three unknowns all other equilibrium values can be determined from the relationships derived in
the text above.
Optimization
The social planner’s optimization problem can be considered as maximizing the unconditional
utility of the current young EW with respect to t1, t2, and l for given values of parameters Yº
<A,B,c*,b,q,q;G>, where





















The unconditional probability of the bad state P is set equal to 1/2, and with equilibrium implying





























where (¯) and s
2
()are unconditional means and variances, respectively.
As discussed earlier, it is useful to decompose EW in different ways in order to interpret the
results. One way is by consumption and leisure, so that












The second way of decomposing EW is by distortion EW1 and instability EW2, where
EW1 º −A(¯ c1−c*)










Given numerical values of parameters, the solution for optimal values of t1, t2, and l is
straightforward. For given parameter values and for given values of t1, t2, and l, the individual’s
conditional supplies of labor, L
B and L
G, and demands for real balances, m
B and m
G, are determined
as described in the previous section of this paper. All other equilibrium quantities are derived from
the labor supply and money demand functions. In particular, quantities of consumption in each period
in each state are derived. Thus, for given parameter values and arbitrary values of t1, t2, and l,a
value can be calculated for EW. We then adapt a program (Uncmin) written by Ellen McGrattan
which uses a gradient methodology to find the values of t1, t2, and l that maximize EW.
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It follows from the budget constraints of the government and individuals that second-period
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G−G . ˆ m G
1+l
That second-period consumption depends only on the state in that period also can be seen to












k , the above relationships for c
k
2 must hold.
Although all the relationships have been derived in the text, it is useful to summarize them










k , where µ
B = 1 and µ
G = q >1



































Welfare criterion: EW = Eµ(1)U(c1,1−L1)+b E µ(2)U(c2,1).
Results
The main issue addressed is how optimal policy decision variables t1, t2, and l change as
government consumption G changes and how these changes in policy variables affect equilibrium19
values of other variables. Two auxiliary issues also are addressed: how the findings are altered when
l is chosen optimally as opposed to being set at zero and how they are altered when there is serial
correlation q > 1/2 as opposed to serial independence q = 1/2.
In order to address the main issue, we first assume numerical values for Yº
<A,B,c*,b,q,q;G> = <2.0,10.0,4.0,0.9,1.5,0.5;G> and allow G to range from 0.00 to 0.20 by
increments of 0.01. This choice of parameter values generates reasonable labor supply functions
(between zero and all the time available and upward sloping with respect to the real wage, e.g.,
productivity) and allows comparability to other tax structures in previous Miller (1984, 1993a) studies.
Table 1 reports maximizing values for t1, t2, and l and equilibrium values for other quantities as G
increases by increments of 0.05.
For the most part the policy decision variables change as expected to increases in government
consumption G. The linear part of the income tax structure t1 is the major part of the income tax,
and it increases as G increases. In contrast the quadratic part of the income tax structure t2 moves
from a positive number to increasingly negative numbers. This indicates that the tax structure moves
from one which is progressive to ones which are more and more regressive. The rate of money
creation l increases as G increases, but somewhat surprisingly it changes very little and remains
negative for all values of G. Also surprising is that the changes in policy decision variables, as well
as the changes in other variables in the table, indicate approximate linearity with respect to G. This
is surprising because while the model is linear-quadratic with respect to consumption and leisure, it
appears to be highly nonlinear with respect to the policy decision variables.
The means of budget variables reveal two big surprises. First, the table indicates how much
of the increase in government consumption is absorbed by a cut in transfers. For instance, the table
shows that when G increases from 0.0000 to 0.0500, average transfers T ¯r decline by 0.0495, from
0.0186 to −0.0309. Thus, average expenditures E ¯x increase by only 0.0005, from 0.0186 to 0.0191.20
The second surprise is that taxes T ¯ increase by more than E ¯x, so that the government’s budget surplus
grows slightly as G increases. Evidently, the government’s deflation subsidy grows even though the
rate of deflation falls. As we see for the next set of variables, the deflation subsidy increases because
real money holdings, the base for the deflation subsidy, rise more than the deflation rate declines.
Individual decision variables respond as expected to the changes in budget variables. Because
their transfers in the second period decline, individuals wish to save more to replace some of that lost
income. Therefore, they increase their demand for real savings m, which drives down the price level.
And because an increase in G represents a loss in their income and consumption, the individuals
desire to replace some of the loss by working more.
The means of consumption, labor, and income all behave as expected. The table indicates
that as G increases, the loss is spread by agents over their consumption and leisure. This results in
lower means for consumption in each period, higher average labor supply, and hence higher average
output.
Although utility functions include variances of consumption and leisure as their measures of
instability, the table next includes coefficients of variation. While they are not the proper measures
of instability, they are independent of choice of units and are easier to interpret. The table indicates
that as G increases, agents accept more variation in each period’s consumption, in leisure, and in
income.
The final set of variables illustrates two points. The first is that higher government
consumption results in a welfare loss, as shown by declining values of EW. The second is that when
agents and the government adapt optimally to higher government consumption, the welfare loss is
distributed. Welfare associated with first-period consumption EW[c1], with labor EW[L], and with
second-period consumption EW[c2] all decline. Agents accept both more distortion (lower EW1) and
more instability (lower EW2).21
The results in Table 1, as well as those for intermediate values of G, are displayed in Figures
1–7. The figures indicate the relationships among the variables as well as the surprising linearity of
the relationships of the variables with respect to G.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted by doing versions of Figures 1–7 for different parameter
values. New sets of parameters were constructed by changing A, B, c*, b, and q by about 10 percent
from their initial values in Table 1. Perturbations were done one at a time. For all parameter sets
the qualitative relationships shown in Figures 1–7 held.
Table 2 compares the outcomes for G = 0 when l is restricted to be zero and when it is
chosen optimally. The first column comes from Miller (1993a). The second column is the same as
the first column in Table 1. Table 2 shows that when the government is free to choose the rate of
money growth, it shrinks the money stock. It finances the deflation subsidy with higher taxes and
makes the tax structure more progressive. The reason for the greater progressivity is contained in
Miller (1993a). The tax/transfer scheme in this model serves two purposes: it allows goods to be
transferred across generations, and it provides insurance by (potentially) reducing income instability.
When the government deflates, agents hold more real balances, as indicated in the table, and hence
more of the transfer of goods to be handled through the money channel. The tax/transfer system is
then used more for insurance, and more progressivity leads to less instability.
When the government deflates and has a more progressive income tax structure, the main
effect on individuals is that they substitute from first- to second-period consumption. In the table ¯ c1
declines by 0.0076, from 0.6843 to 0.6767, while ¯ c2 rises by 0.0062, from 0.3400 to 0.3462.
Similarly, EW[c1] declines by 0.0989, from −22.1482 to −22.2471, while EW[c2] rises by 0.0815,
from −24.1139 to −24.0324. Agents are also willing to trade off a little more distortion for a little
less instability.22
Finally, Table 3 indicates how the results are affected by an increase in the assumed level of
serial correlation in the productivity shock q. The table shows that the variables change qualitatively
the same when G increases from 0.00 to 0.05 whether q = 0.50, 0.55, or 0.60 (seen by comparing
columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), or (5) and (6)). However, as q rises, taxes T, transfers Tr, and the
deflation subsidy −l all decrease (seen by comparing columns (1), (3), and (5), or (2), (4), and (6)).
While taxes fall, the degree of progressivity t2 rises. As q rises, agents save more and work more,




G increases more than L
B. These changes result in more consumption in each period.
Accordingly EW[c1] and EW[c2] both rise while EW[L] falls. The changes result in both lower
distortion EW1 and less instability EW2. An interpretation is that a higher l increases predictability
and lowers the probability that savers in a good state are going to face a low return on their savings
when they are ready to spend them. Thus, they are willing to work and save more and, therefore,
need less incentive to do so in terms of a lower t2 and l. Moreover, since they produce more in
good times, the extra income has less marginal value, so that they are willing to transfer more to
second-period consumption via a higher t2.
Conclusion
The most striking finding of this analysis is that higher government consumption should be
financed primarily by cuts in social security benefits. This finding goes so against the grain of
current political thinking that it brings into question the validity of the model. Yet this finding is not
as crazy as it initially seems.
The contrast between politicians’ defense of social security and the model’s attack on it can
be attributed to two sources:23
1. Politicians care about the wishes of current voters, while the model is concerned about the
current young and all future generations.
2. The social security system in practice involves a lot of redistribution among agents of the
same generation, while the model’s system involves none.
In terms of objective functions, it can be argued that voters’ choices do not properly account
for the welfare of future generations, so that their choices are suboptimal in terms of social welfare.
That is, in the case of social security, voters might choose to protect it, when in the country’s long-
run interest, as represented by the model’s social welfare function, it should be diminished.
However, even from a social welfare point of view, the model’s EW function can be properly
criticized for ignoring the utility of the initial old, and those agents would clearly be hurt by a cut in
social security payments. Including the utility of the initial old would imply that a cut in social
security payments would not be Pareto optimal. Yet if a welfare function were assumed that was a
discounted sum of utilities of the initial old, the initial young, and all future generations, and the
discount rate d on å
¥
t=0d
tUt were not too low, then the welfare gains of the initial young and all future
generations would overwhelm the welfare loss of the initial old. Thus, voters’ preferences may be
an inadequate guide to what is in the long-run interests of the economy. A social welfare function
which does provide an adequate guide and incorporates the utility of the current old is not likely to
overturn the model’s finding about the desirability of reducing social security in light of a permanent
increase in government consumption.
But that finding would have to be tempered in applying it to our current system. The current
system can be thought of as a redistribution from the young to the old as well as a redistribution
among the old. The model’s system involves a redistribution only from the young to the old. The
model thus suggests that if government consumption permanently increased, it would be best to alter
tax rates just a little and finance the majority of the increase by a cut in social security benefits to24
middle- and upper-income individuals. By cutting these benefits the young and future generations
could best adapt their employment and private savings decisions to the loss implied by higher
government consumption. This logic is similar to that used by Feldstein (1987), Miller (1993b), and
Becker and Ehrlich (1994) in arguing to replace the intergenerational transfer part of social security
with a private pension system.
With all this said, one could still wonder what the model would imply if social security could
not be touched, as the current political climate would demand. This might be implemented in the
model by fixing transfers at their optimal levels forG=0 ,s othat when G increases, the transfers
stay at those levels. Since the transfers don’t fully absorb the increases in G when they are free to
adjust, one can be confident that the qualitative results of the model with respect to taxes will still
hold when transfers don’t absorb any of the increases in G: explicit taxes will increase; the rise in
taxes will create more distortion, causing the tax structure to become more regressive—that is, t1 will
increase and t2 will decrease—and since both explicit and implicit taxes distort, desirable policies will
spread the distortion, causing the rate of money creation to increase. The question which does not
have a readily apparent answer is, Could l ever become positive? A guess is that it could, since
agents would want to lower their leisure and consumption in each period, and with transfers fixed a
higher l is the main incentive for agents to save less and consume less in their second period. Thus,
if G became large enough, it would seem that l could go positive.
Given misgivings some may have about some of the model’s assumptions, it seems reasonable
to wonder which of the findings are likely to be robust. I suggest three:
1. The desired level of social security benefits cannot be considered independently. It
depends on what’s going on in the rest of the budget, with respect to both expenditures and
taxes. This has long been the CBO’s (1992, pp. 33ff) position.25
2. As government spending increases, the income tax structure should become more
regressive to serve efficiency. As the tax burden rises, tax distortion becomes more of a
problem which regressivity can mitigate.
3. As government spending increases, the optimal rate of money growth should increase.
Since all available taxes distort, a higher tax burden should be spread among all taxes, both
explicit and implicit.26
Notes
1Models following the standard approach include Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994),
and Krussel, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1995). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) use an overlapping
generations structure as in my model, but their agents live for many periods and that would tend
to prevent valued fiat money. Thus, while their model can be calibrated, they analyze public
finance questions in a real economy. Much of the focus of my research is to examine such
questions in a monetary economy.
2It is shown in this model that if a government has access to lump-sum taxes, the tax
should be higher in the good state than in the bad state. This indicates a role for economic
stabilization, since if minimal distortion were the sole goal, a lump-sum tax constant across states
would do.
3“B” and “G” also denote, respectively, a parameter in the utility function and government
consumption. However, the notation should not lead to confusion, since when, and only when,
B and G appear as superscripts, do they represent states of technology.
4McGrattan’s solution method requires good initial estimates of the maximizers. When
G = 0, initial values for t1, t2, and l are chosen by using a grid search to find the maximizing
values of t1 and t2 with l restricted to be 0. For each incrementally higher value of G, Gi =G i−1
+ DG, the initial estimates of t1, t2, and l for Gi are the maximizing values found for Gi−1. After
finding McGrattan’s solution, we do a grid search to increase the precision of the solution.27
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[A,B,c*,b,q,q] = [2,10,4,0.9,1.5,0.5]
Value of Variable When G =
Variable 0 .0500 .1000 .1500 .2000
t1 .0173 .0189 .0207 .0221 .0235
t2 .0009 .0000 −.0010 −.0018 −.0026
l −.0042 −.0041 −.0040 −.0038 −.0037
T ¯r .0186 −.0309 −.0802 −.1296 −.1788
T ¯ .0199 .0205 .0213 .0219 .0228
E ¯x .0186 .0191 .0198 .0204 .0212
Def −.0013 −.0014 −.0015 −.0015 −.0016
m
B .2986 .3229 .3470 .3711 .3953
m
G .3540 .3826 .4109 .4392 .4675
L
B .7067 .7107 .7146 .7185 .7223
L
G .8928 .8991 .9057 .9121 .9185
¯ c1 .6767 .6565 .6362 .6162 .5959
L ¯ .7998 .8049 .8101 .8153 .8204
¯ c2 .3462 .3232 .3003 .2771 .2542
¯ y 1.0230 1.0297 1.0365 1.0433 1.0501
cv(c1) 41.6686% 43.0576% 44.5633% 46.1438% 47.8541%
cv(L) 11.6306% 11.7059% 11.7953% 11.8744% 11.9594%
cv(c2) 9.8845% 11.2436% 12.8011% 14.6170% 16.7577%
cv(y) 30.9116% 30.9806% 31.0625% 31.1349% 31.2129%
EW −52.7622 −53.4218 −54.0855 −54.7533 −55.4253
EW[c1] −22.2471 −22.5180 −22.7905 −23.0624 −23.3384
EW[L] −6.4827 −6.5677 −6.6541 −6.7404 −6.8273
EW[c2] −24.0324 −24.3361 −24.6409 −24.9505 −25.2596
EW1 −52.5145 −53.1708 −53.8307 −54.4950 −55.1631
EW2 −.2477 −.2510 −.2547 −.2583 −.2622Table 2

































































































t1 .0173 .0189 .0140 .0160 .0108 .0130
t2 .0009 .0000 .0017 .0006 .0024 .0012
l −.0042 −.0041 −.0037 −.0036 −.0032 −.0030
T ¯r .0186 −.0309 −.0163 −.0331 .0140 −.0352
T ¯ .0199 .0205 .0175 .0182 .0150 .0158
E ¯x .0186 .0191 .0163 .0169 .0140 .0148
Def −.0013 −.0014 −.0012 −.0012 −.0010 −.0010
m
B .2986 .3229 .2990 .3230 .2990 .3266
m
G .3540 .3826 .3600 .3886 .3668 .3952
L
B .7067 .7107 .7078 .7117 .7088 .7126
L
G .8928 .8991 .8941 .9007 .8957 .9022
¯ c1 .6767 .6565 .6775 .6574 .6783 .6582
L ¯ .7998 .8049 .8010 .8062 .8023 .8074
¯ c2 .3462 .3232 .3470 .3240 .3480 .3247
¯ y 1.0230 1.0297 1.0245 1.0314 1.0262 1.0330
cv(c1) 41.6686% 43.0576% 41.3551% 42.7372% 40.9933% 42.3264%
cv(L) 11.6306% 11.7059% 11.6315% 11.7231% 11.6493% 11.7447%
cv(c2) 9.8845% 11.2436% 10.5213% 11.9613% 11.3102% 12.8649%
cv(y) 30.9116% 30.9806% 30.9124% 30.9963% 30.9287% 31.0162%
EW −52.7622 −53.4218 −52.7596 −53.4191 −52.7566 −53.4158
EW[c1] −22.2471 −22.5180 −22.2347 −22.5044 −22.2225 −22.4898
EW[L] −6.4827 −6.5677 −6.5022 −6.5890 −6.5239 −6.6091
EW[c2] −24.0324 −24.3361 −24.0227 −24.3256 −24.0102 −24.3169
EW1 −52.5145 −53.1708 −52.5134 −53.1692 −52.5118 −53.1675
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Figure 7      A=2, B=10, c*=4.0, beta=0.9, theta=1.6